# First Order Predicate Logic Formal Semantics and Related Notions

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#### Formal Semantics

Up to now, our presentation of predicate logic formulas, their manipulation and proving, was mainly based on the form (syntax) of the formulas; this leaves many questions open.

- Equivalence of formulas:
  - What exactly does a formula mean, e.g., when do two syntactically different formulas express the same fact?
- Soundness and completeness of proving rules:
  - Proving rules allow by only considering the form of formulas to judge that some formula is a consequence of some other formulas.
  - But are the derived judgements really always true, i.e., are the rules really sound?
  - Furthermore, can all true judgements be derived, i.e., are the rules also complete?

We will answer these questions by underpinning our previous presentation with a formal definition of the meaning (semantics) of formulas.



#### Formal Semantics

The meaning of a predicate logic formula depends on the following entities.

- ► Domain D
  - A non-empty set, the universe about which the formula talks.

$$D = \mathbb{N}$$
.

- ▶ Interpretation *I* of all function and predicate symbols
  - ▶ Constants: For every constant c, I(c) denotes an element of D, i.e.,  $I(c) \in D$ .
  - ► Functions: For every function symbol f with arity n > 0, I(f) denotes an n-ary function on D, i.e.,  $I(f): D^n \to D$ .
  - ▶ Predicates: For every predicate symbol p with arity n > 0, I(p) denotes an n-ary predicate (relation) on D, i.e.,  $I(p) \subseteq D^n$ .

$$I = [0 \mapsto zero, + \mapsto add, < \mapsto less-than, \ldots]$$

- ▶ Assignment  $a: Var \rightarrow D$ 
  - A function that maps every variable x to a value a(x) in this domain.

$$a = [x \mapsto 1, y \mapsto 0, z \mapsto 3, \ldots]$$

## The pair M = (D, I) is also called a *structure*.



#### The Semantics of Terms

$$D, I, a \longrightarrow \llbracket t \rrbracket \longrightarrow d \in D$$

- ▶ Term semantics  $[t]_a^{D,I} \in D$ 
  - Given D, I, a, the semantics of term t is a value in D.
  - ► This value is defined by structural induction on *t*.

$$t ::= x \mid c \mid f(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$$

- - ▶ The semantics of a variable is the value given by the assignment.
- - ▶ The semantics of a constant is the value given by the interpretation.
- $|| f(t_1,...,t_n) ||_a^{D,I} := I(f)(||t_1||_a^{D,I},...,||t_n||_a^{D,I})$ 
  - The semantics of a function application is the result of the interpretation of the function symbol applied to the values of the argument terms.



## Example

```
D = \mathbb{N} = \{ zero, one, two, three, \ldots \}
a = [x \mapsto one, y \mapsto two, \ldots]
I = [0 \mapsto zero, + \mapsto add, \ldots]
                 [x+(y+0)]_{2}^{D,I} = add([x]_{2}^{D,I}, [y+0]_{2}^{D,I})
                                        = add(a(x), ||y+0||_a^{D,I})
                                        = add(one, [v+0]_2^{D,I})
                                        = add(one, add(\llbracket y \rrbracket_2^{D,I}, \llbracket 0 \rrbracket_2^{D,I}))
                                        = add(one, add(a(y), I(0))
                                        = add(one, add(two, zero))
                                        = add(one, two)
                                        = three
```

The meaning of the term with the "usual" interpretation.



## Example

$$\begin{split} &D = \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N}) = \{\emptyset, \{zero\}, \{one\}, \{two\}, \dots, \{zero, one\}, \dots\} \\ &a = [x \mapsto \{one\}, y \mapsto \{two\}, \dots] \\ &I = [0 \mapsto \emptyset, + \mapsto union, \dots] \end{split}$$

$$[x + (y + 0)]_{a}^{D,I} = union([x]_{a}^{D,I}, [y + 0]_{a}^{D,I})$$

$$= union(a(x), [y + 0]_{a}^{D,I})$$

$$= union(\{one\}, [y + 0]_{a}^{D,I})$$

$$= union(\{one\}, union([y]_{a}^{D,I}, [0]_{a}^{D,I}))$$

$$= union(\{one\}, union(a(y), I(0))$$

$$= union(\{one\}, union(\{two\}, emptyset))$$

$$= union(\{one\}, \{two\})$$

$$= \{one, two\}$$

The meaning of the term with another interpretation.



### The Semantics of Formulas

$$D, I, a \longrightarrow \llbracket F \rrbracket \longrightarrow true, false$$

- ▶ Formula semantics  $[\![F]\!]_a^{D,I} \in \{true, false\}$ 
  - Given D, I, a, the semantics of term T is a truth value.
  - ▶ This value is defined by structural induction on *F*.

$$F := p(t_1, \dots, t_n) \mid \top \mid \bot$$
$$\mid \neg F \mid F_1 \land F_2 \mid F_1 \lor F_2 \mid F_1 \to F_2 \mid F_1 \leftrightarrow F_2$$
$$\mid \forall x : F \mid \exists x : F \mid \dots$$

- - The semantics of a atomic formula is the result of the interpretation of the predicate symbol applied to the values of the argument terms.
- $Arr \| T \|_a^{D,I} := true, \| \bot \|_a^{D,I} := false$



And now for the non-atomic formulas.

# The Semantics of Propositional Formulas

The semantics coincides here with that of propositional logic.



## The Semantics of Quantified Formulas

Formula is true, if body F is true for every value of the domain assigned to x.

Formula is true, if body F is true for at least one value of the domain assigned to x.

$$a[x \mapsto d](y) = \begin{cases} d & \text{if } x = y \\ a(y) & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

The core of the semantics.



## Example



#### Semantic Notions

Let F denote formulas, M structures, a assignments.

- ► *F* is satisfiable, if  $\llbracket F \rrbracket_a^M = true$  for some *M* and *a*. p(0,x) is satisfiable;  $q(x) \land \neg q(x)$  is not.
- ▶ M is a model of F (short:  $M \models F$ ), if  $\llbracket F \rrbracket_a^M = true$  for all a.  $(\mathbb{N}, [0 \mapsto zero, p \mapsto less-equal]) \models p(0,x)$
- ► F is valid (short:  $\models F$ ), if  $M \models F$  for all M.  $\models p(x) \land (p(x) \rightarrow q(x)) \rightarrow q(x)$ 
  - F is satisfiable, if  $\neg F$  is not valid.
  - F is valid, if  $\neg F$  is not satisfiable.
- ightharpoonup F is a logical consequence of formula set Γ (short:  $\Gamma \models F$ ), if for all M and a, the following is true:

If 
$$[\![G]\!]_a^M = \text{true for every } G \text{ in } \Gamma$$
, then also  $[\![F]\!]_a^M = \text{true}$ .  $p(x), p(x) \to q(x) \models q(x)$ 

▶  $F_1$  is a logical consequence of formula  $F_2$ , if  $\{F_2\} \models F_1$ .



## Logical Equivalence

We are now going to address the first question stated in the beginning.

- ▶ Definition: two formulas  $F_1$  and  $F_2$  are logically equivalent (short:  $F_1 \Leftrightarrow F_2$ ), if  $F_1 \models F_2$  and  $F_2 \models F_1$ .
- ▶ Lemma: if  $F \Leftrightarrow F'$  and  $G \Leftrightarrow G'$ , then

$$\neg F \Leftrightarrow \neg F'$$

$$F \land G \Leftrightarrow F' \land G'$$

$$F \lor G \Leftrightarrow F' \lor G'$$

$$F \to G \Leftrightarrow F' \to G'$$

$$\forall x : F \Leftrightarrow \forall x : F'$$

$$\exists x : F \Leftrightarrow \exists x : F'$$

Logically equivalent formulas can be substituted in any context without affecting the logical equivalence of the result (since  $F \Leftrightarrow G$  iff  $F \leftrightarrow G$  is valid, this justifies the proof rule A- $\leftrightarrow$ ).



## Expressiveness of First-Order Logic

Variables denote elements of the domain, thus no quantification is possible over functions and predicates of the domain.

This would require second-order predicate logic.

Nevertheless we express in first-order logic statements such as

$$\forall A, B, f \in A \rightarrow B : f$$
 is bijective  $\rightarrow \exists g \in B \rightarrow A : \forall x \in B : f(g(x)) = x$ 

▶ This is possible because formulas are usually interpreted over the domain of sets, i.e., all variables denote sets:

$$A \rightarrow B := \{ S \subseteq A \times B \mid (\forall a \in A : \exists b \in B : (a, b) \in S) \land (\forall a, a', b : (a, b) \in S \land (a', b) \in S \rightarrow a = a') \}$$

▶ Terms like f(g(x)) involve a hidden binary function "apply"

$$f(g(x)) \rightsquigarrow apply(f, apply(g, x))$$

which denotes "function application":

$$apply(f,x) :=$$
the  $y:(x,y) \in f$ 

First-order predicate logic over the domain of sets is the "working horse" of mathematics; virtually all of mathematics is formulated in this framework.

# Soundness and Completeness of First-Order Logic

Now we turn our attention to the second question.

Completeness Theorem (Kurt Gödel, 1929): First order predicate logic has a proof calculus for which the following holds:

- ▶ Soundness: if by the rules of the calculus a conclusion F can be derived from a set of assumptions  $\Gamma$  ( $\Gamma \vdash F$ ), then F is a logical consequence of  $\Gamma$  ( $\Gamma \models F$ ).
- ▶ Completeness: if F is a logical consequence of  $\Gamma$  ( $\Gamma \models F$ ), then by the rules of the calculus F can be derived from  $\Gamma$  ( $\Gamma \vdash F$ ).

No logic that is stronger (more expressive) than first order predicate logic has a proof calculus that also enjoys both soundness and completeness.



# Undecidability of First-Order Logic

The existence of a complete proof calculus does not mean that the truth of every formula is algorithmically decidable.

- ▶ Undecidability (Church/Turing, 1936/1937): there does not exist any algorithm that for given formula set  $\Gamma$  and formula F always terminates and says whether  $\Gamma \models F$  holds or not.
- ▶ Semidecidability: but there exists an algorithm, that for given  $\Gamma$  and F, if  $\Gamma \models F$ , detects this fact in a finite amount of time.

This algorithm searches for a proof of  $\Gamma \vdash F$  in a complete proof calculus; if such a proof exists, it will eventually detect it; however, if no such proof exists, the search runs forever.

Automatic proof search is not able to detect that a formula is not true.



# Limits of First-Order Logic

Not every structure can be completely described by a finite set of formulas.

- ▶ Incompleteness Theorem (Kurt Gödel, 1931): it is in no sound logic possible to prove all true arithmetic statements (i.e., all statements about natural numbers with addition and multiplication).
  - ► To adequately characterize N, the (infinite) axiom scheme of mathematical induction has to be added.
- ► Corollary: in every sound formal system that is sufficiently rich there are statements that can neither be proved nor disproved.

In practice, complete reasoners for first-order logic are often supported by (complete or incomplete) reasoners for special theories.

